15 ideas
| 18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
| 18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
| 18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
| 18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
| 18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
| 18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
| 21226 | Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
| 8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
| 8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
| 8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
| 18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
| 21228 | Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 21225 | The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |